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Abstract
From self-driving cars to smart city sensors, billions of devices will be connected to networks in the next few years. These
devices will collect vast amounts of data which needs to be processed in real-time, overwhelming centralized cloud ar-
chitectures. To address this need, the industry seeks to process data closer to the source, driving a major shift from the
cloud to the ‘edge.’ This article critically investigates the privacy implications of edge computing. It outlines the abilities
introduced by the edge by drawing on two recently published scenarios, an automated license plate reader and an ethnic
facial detection model. Based on these affordances, three key questions arise: what kind of data will be collected, how
will this data be processed at the edge, and how will this data be ‘completed’ in the cloud? As a site of intermediation
between user and cloud, the edge allows data to be extracted from individuals, acted on in real-time, and then abstracted
or sterilized, removing identifying information before being stored in conventional data centers. The article thus argues
that edge affordances establish a fundamental new ‘privacy condition’ while sidestepping the safeguards associated with
the ‘privacy proper’ of personal data use. Responding effectively to these challenges will mean rethinking person-based
approaches to privacy at both regulatory and citizen-led levels.
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1. Introduction
Cloud architectures have reached a crisis point. From self-
driving cars to smart city sensors; 30 billion devices will
be connected to networks in the next few years (Stack,
2018). Yet existing cloud infrastructures are not designed
for their needs. As Shi and Dustdar (2016, p. 78) explain;
“the bandwidth of the networks that carry data to and
from the cloud has not increased appreciably. Thus; with
edge devices generating more data; the network is be-
coming cloud computing’s bottleneck.” Connected med-
ical devices will generate huge volumes of data, con-
nected cars will need near real-time processing, and con-
nected cameras will capture extremely personal informa-
tion. These three properties—data volume, data latency,
and data privacy—are driving a shift away from the cloud
model (Simonelli, 2019).
The technology industry aims to address these needs
by moving computation and storage to where it is
needed. Over the next few years; this will mean shifting
many applications from centralized data center facilities
to highly distributed devices at the edge of the network—
from the center to the ‘edge’ or from the cloud to the
‘fog.’ Simply put, the edge is both a paradigm and an
architecture that aims to store and process data closer
to the source. Rather than having to move massive vol-
umes of data all the way back to the cloud—a slow,
expensive; or even unviable proposition—the edge pro-
cesses it on site, addressing both latency and bandwidth
issues. In doing so, the edge functions as a distributed
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layer of intelligence deployed at a local level (Luan et al.,
2015). Practically this will take the form of cameras, sen-
sors, switches, and micro-servers installed throughout
vehicles, homes, workplaces, neighborhoods, and the
broader urban environment. Following Shi and Dustdar
(2016, p. 79) then, an edge device is “any computing or
networking resource residing between data sources and
cloud-based data centers.” A smartphone could act as
the edge between the body and the cloud; a smart home
gateway could be the edge device between the home
and the cloud.
In capturing, processing, and distributing highly per-
sonal information, the shift to the edge introduces criti-
cal new challenges to privacy. Yet existing scholarship on
the edge and privacy is largely constrained to computer
science and security, focusing tightly on solving specific
technical problems (Alrawais, Alhothaily, Hu, & Cheng,
2017; Mukherjee et al., 2017; Roman, Lopez, & Mambo,
2018; Yi, Qin, & Li, 2015). Instead, this article poses a dif-
ferent research question: How are privacy-related condi-
tionsmodulated by the edge, andwhat are the social and
individual implications of this modulation? If the edge
was always predicted to be a technical challenge, a ‘non-
trivial’ extension to the cloud (Bonomi, Milito, Zhu, &
Addepalli, 2012) it is also a highly political technology in
transforming the way data can be handled and informa-
tion extracted. The article will argue that the edge allows
a form of individualization without identification, shap-
ing privacy conditions while sidestepping the harder reg-
ulatory frameworks associated with ‘personal data’ as it
is conventionally understood.
First, this article outlines the capabilities of the edge
and introduces two specific understandings of privacy.
Then, it posits two edge computing scenarios: ethnic fa-
cial recognition and an automated license plate reader.
In each scenario, edge devices extract data and trans-
form it into actionable insights, but then anonymize or
abstract it before transferring it back to centralized data
centers. The new affordances of the edge thus introduce
new decisions around data. After that, the article poses
these questions: what data to collect, how to process
it at the edge, and how to ‘complete’ it in the cloud.
Finally, the article discusses the implications of this shift,
in establishing an intermediate layer of intelligence be-
tween the user and the cloud, edge computing circum-
vents some of the traditional privacy safeguards that
have focused heavily on personal data collection and
cloud storage.
2. Privacy Proper vs. Privacy Conditions
Much of the computer science literature surrounding pri-
vacy and the edge has focused on the security of per-
sonal data. While cloud data centers have developed a
formidable array of hardware and software security fea-
tures over time, edge-based hardware—consumer prod-
ucts like cameras, phones, and wearable devices—often
only feature consumer-level protections. Such devices
are often ‘resource poor,’ their micro-controllers were
not designed for connectivity and lack the processing
power to run cryptographic procedures, resulting in se-
curity issues such as authentication, access control, and
data protection (Alrawais et al., 2017, p. 35). Moreover,
rather than the closed ecosystem of the centralized data
center, where a company can control access to servers,
edge networks are a far more open, unrestricted ar-
chitecture composed of potentially hundreds or thou-
sands of devices, often operated by different providers.
Because of this lack of a global perimeter, edge comput-
ing is more susceptible to rogue gateway attacks, where
network nodes pretend to be legitimate and coax users
to share data with them (Roman et al., 2018, p. 13). Edge
hardware thus presents a highly vulnerable site, open
to exploits. Stored on a diverse array of devices, many
with minimal consumer-grade protections, this informa-
tion presents a rich target for leaks and hacks. Already
there have been a number of high-profile attacks exploit-
ing these weaknesses. From cardiac devices at St Jude’s
Hospital to the TRENDnet webcam hack and the Mirai
botnet that caused large sections of the Internet to go
down, these examples demonstrate that “much of the
embedded firmware running connected devices is in-
secure and highly vulnerable, leaving an indeterminate
number of critical systems at risk” (Dunlap, 2017).
If edge hardware itself is more vulnerable, the con-
tent it captures only amplifies these concerns. Edge de-
vices have significantly more potential to collect highly
personal and highly detailed data. From health monitors
to home assistants, many of these devices will be phys-
ically close to users or situated in the heart of their liv-
ing environments, capturing more intimate data. The on-
board camera of a self-driving car, for instance, will be
switched on and recording for the entire duration of a
driving session (Bloom, Tan, Ramjohn, & Bauer, 2017).
It might be capturing the driver’s face, but also her sur-
rounding world, including her children and passengers.
Edge-computing means this data no longer has to be
heavily compressed snapshots that can be transferred to
the cloud. From a privacy perspective, lifting this techni-
cal constraint means that a camera can be both higher
resolution and lower latency, allowing the capture of a
glance, for instance, at 60 frames per second. Moreover,
devices on the edge, whether comprising a smartphone,
a wearable device, a vehicle, or a network of cameras
distributed throughout an urban space, have the po-
tential to capture fine-grained location data. Locational
data alone is highly valuable, aggregated over time it
becomes a timeline of an individual’s movements, pro-
viding an incisive window into their habits, behaviors,
and preferences. As Barreneche and Wilken (2015) as-
sert, such locational data becomes a sophisticated form
of ‘geodemographic profiling’ that can then be leveraged
for predictive purposes. Already we’ve seen how such lo-
cational data can be used to harass and target individu-
als, whether by law enforcement agencies (Munn, 2018)
or private companies (Hill, 2014).
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Overall, then, edge literature conflates privacy
with personal data security. In this view, while the
problem is technically challenging, it is theoretically
straightforward—translating existing technologies like
encryption to the edgewill ensure ‘privacy’ for all (Zhang,
Chen, Zhao, Cheng, & Hu, 2018; Zhang, Wang, Du, &
Guizani, 2018).
In focusing on the security of personal data, edge lit-
erature coheres closely to the concept of privacy devel-
oped by the General Data Projection Regulation (GDPR),
a version of privacy I will term ‘privacy proper.’ While the
GDPR was conceived in the European Union, its defini-
tions and framings have been taken up by various coun-
tries around the world. Applied to over 500 million cit-
izens, the GDPR now forms one of the “de facto global
standards for data privacy and protection” (Barrett,
2019). For the GDPR, personal data is key. “The term
‘personal data’ is the entryway” to the application of the
regulation, states the law, “only if a processing of data
concerns personal data” does the GDPR apply (European
Commission, 2018). What exactly constitutes personal
data? The regulation states that “data must therefore be
assignable to identified or identifiable living persons to
be considered personal” (European Commission, 2018).
Once data conforms to this definition, the company or
agency becomes a ‘data processor’ who must maintain
compliance—hamstrung in terms of what kinds of data
may be captured, how it may be stored and accessed,
and which borders it may cross. In this article, privacy
proper will thus designate a threshold that actors do not
wish to cross, a regulatory minefield triggered when or-
ganizations begin dealing with personal data.
Certainly, the edgepresents someobvious challenges
for personal data security. Yet more subtly, the edge may
shape privacy-related abilities without necessarily pro-
cessing or storing personal data. To differentiate this pos-
sibility, I introduce a second term, ‘privacy condition,’
drawing on recent work by legal scholar Julie Cohen.
To rescue privacy from vague rhetoric and unenforce-
able ideals, Cohen begins not from the figure of the self,
but from the ground of the underlying conditions “that
are needed to produce sufficiently private and privacy-
valuing subjects” (Cohen, 2019, p. 1). If rights discourse
and legal rhetoric can be abstract, then conditions have
a specificity, a concreteness. Conditions actively enable
some privacy-related abilities while making others im-
probable or even impossible. Digital data and the shar-
ing of information has made the stakes of these abili-
ties and inabilities suddenly very clear. This is why, even
though privacy clearly has a long lineage in liberal politi-
cal philosophy, Cohen stresses that privacy is a “paradig-
matic information-era right,” one not defined by rights
discourse, but by the conditions established within the
“political economy of informationalism” (Cohen, 2019,
p. 2; see also Cohen, 2017).
Given this framing, Cohen wants to focus on the
particular set of “design, production, and operational
practices’ most likely to produce privacy-valuing condi-
tions” (Cohen, 2019, p. 1). A distinct version of privacy
emerges from a set of affordances, the possible range of
usesmade available by an object or environment (Cohen,
2019, p. 12). In otherwords, particular privacy conditions
emerge from particular technical configurations. As a
nascent technology, the edge enables new affordances,
allowing subjects to be apprehended, mediated, and re-
sponded to in distinct new ways—even when, or espe-
cially when, so-called personal data is never handled.
With these two terms defined, the following scenarios
focus on how edge affordances modulate privacy condi-
tions while allowing actors to sidestep the requirements
attached to privacy proper.
3. Two Scenarios
The first scenario is license plate capture and analysis,
drawn from a recent article on hybrid cloud-edge com-
puting (Zhang, Zhang, Shi, & Zhong, 2018). The authors
lament the siloed nature of current data collection. They
suggest that many public and private agencies would
have an interest in obtaining license plate data in order
to understandwhere citizens are located andwhere they
travel to. Yet due to anxieties around data sharing and
user authentication, each of these institutions conducts
their own data capture and maintains their own cloud-
based repository. The result is that “data owned by mul-
tiple stakeholders is rarely shared among data owners”
(Zhang et al., 2018, p. 2004).
The edge introduces new possibilities into this sce-
nario. For one, edge nodes can act as a nexus, combin-
ing data sources from multiple stakeholders. As Zhang
et al. (2018, p. 2005) suggest, footage from the on-body
cameras of police officers could be combined with squad
car camera feeds, mobile uploads and more traditional
CCTV feeds to form a far more extensive and compre-
hensive data source. Data can be assembled from vari-
ous sources, processed in order to remove sensitive infor-
mation, and then distributed to stakeholders. The edge’s
ability to decouple data collection fromdata storage thus
has the potential to foster formerly unworkable alliances.
For instance, Zhang et al. (2018, p. 2005) note that both
private insurance companies and public district health
boards would be interested in some of the same data.
Groups of institutions might band together to collect li-
cense plate data, smart city data, or health data, creating
broad infrastructures of surveillance.
Of course, this indiscriminate surveillance introduces
a range of problems if privacy proper is invoked. Any
one of these raw video feeds might capture facial details
that could be used to identify an individual, overstep-
ping the privacy boundaries allowed by an institution. Yet
the edge can again provide a solution. In aggregating this
data at a site long before it arrives back at the cloud, the
edge acts as a kind of pre-processor for data. Rather than
transferring all of the raw video data back to the cloud,
Zhang et al. (2018, p. 2005) propose that the edge node
conducts video clipping, scanning “video streams to se-
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lectively filter out frames with a license plate.” Edge com-
putation would locate only those frames where black let-
ters on a white background indicate a license plate. Each
frame is then cropped to only show the plate, and opti-
cal character recognition technology converts the plate
photograph to its alphanumeric equivalent, e.g., CLA974.
Finally, this small text field is transferred to the cloud fa-
cilities of each stakeholder. By introducing an interme-
diary layer between capture and cloud, between user
and stakeholder, the edge also introduces a new set of
privacy-challenging affordances. Data can be collected
from multiple stakeholders but then parsed at the edge,
selected, sampled, and scrubbed before continuing on to
cloud-based facilities. These dynamics can also be seen
in the next scenario of edge computing.
The second scenario is the facial detection of ethnic
minorities. In 2019, Wang, Zhang, Liu, Liu, andMiao pub-
lished the article ‘Facial Feature Discovery for Ethnicity
Recognition.’ While this article was not explicitly posited
as an edge application, speculating about its transfer to
this domain is hardly a leap. Indeed, as a slew of recent
technical articles suggest, researchers are already em-
bracing the new possibilities that edge computing offers
for facial detection in urban areas (Dautov et al., 2018),
crowd monitoring (Bailas, Marsden, Zhang, O’Connor, &
Little, 2018), and intelligent surveillance (Hu et al., 2018),
with one going so far as to call real-time video analytics
the edge’s ‘killer app’ (Ananthanarayanan et al., 2017).
Wang, Zhang, and Taleb (2018, p. 1) begin by noting
that “the analysis of race, nation, and ethnical groups
based on facial images is a popular topic recently in
face recognition community.” Bypassing even the barest
consideration of ethics, the authors suggest that this
new field would naturally be beneficial for state ac-
tors wishing to enforce certain restrictions on their citi-
zens: “With rapid advance of people globalization…face
recognition has great application potential in border con-
trol, customs check, and public security” (Wang et al.,
2018, p. 1) The disturbing enthusiasm for such privacy-
impinging surveillance is not limited to China, but is
increasingly evident across cities in Ecuador, Pakistan,
Kenya, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates (Mozur,
Kessel, & Chan, 2019).
Yet, frustratingly for the article’s authors, ethnicity
can often be difficult to detect, either because the mor-
phologies of race are too subtle or because the individ-
ual contains traces of multiple ethnicities. The problem,
from an engineering perspective, is that “the gene of one
ethnical group is hardly unique and it may include var-
ious gene fragments from some other ethnical groups”
(Wang et al., 2018). Fortunately, facial aspects can be an-
alyzed in a farmore fine-grainedmanner through compu-
tational technologies in order to reveal their ethnicities.
The authors set about identifying three ethnic groups:
Uighur, Tibetan, and Korean (Wang et al., 2018). The arti-
cle, likemany inmachine learning, essentially lays out the
steps used to produce the model and measures its effec-
tiveness against competing models. Themodel is trained
on an image set of university students, and gradually
learns to identify the three ethnic groups with more suc-
cess, displaying progressively lower levels of uncertainty.
Key for the authors’ model is the extraction of a ‘T’
feature from the center of each photograph containing
the lips and nose (Wang et al., 2018). While the T varies
with each ethnic group, thesemorphological features are
considered to be the telltale markings that distinguish
whether an individual is within the targeted ethnic group.
Indeed, the extraction of the T, while obviously deleting
key facial information, amplifies the model’s ability to
detect ethnicity. As the authors note that “actually, the
facial features extracted from the ‘T’ regions are more
suitable for ethnicity recognition since the unrelated in-
formation has been filtered out” (Wang et al., 2018). In
this application, the full photograph of the individual is
unnecessary or even a distraction. The model does not
need to do the computationally intensive work of facial
identification—who exactly an individual is—but rather
the simpler task of determining whether an individual is
‘ethnic’ or not.
Such a technology would seem tailor made for the
edge. As more cameras are connected to networks, the
possibilities of surveillance grow. However, video data it-
self is massive, becoming both economically expensive
and technically infeasible if it is sent back to the cloud.
As the authors of one study suggested, processing raw
video from widely distributed “CCTV cameras and mo-
bile cameras not only incurs uncertainty in data transfer
and timing but also poses significant overhead and delay
to the communication networks” (Nikouei et al., 2018,
p. 1). In the cloud model, images need to be sent from
all the cameras to a data center facility via the network,
be processed in this centralized facility, and then the re-
sult delivered to a client or end-user. This lengthy pro-
cess not only introduces significant latency, but makes
some surveillance applications essentially unviable from
a technical perspective.
Instead, the edge allows processing to be conducted
at the source. No identifying image needs to be sent
back to the cloud and compared against an exhaustive
database of citizens. No personal data is ‘collected’ by
the agency in the sense of being transmitted to a data
center where it will be held indefinitely in a database
or stored on a hard disk. Instead, this machine-learned
model could be compressed and loaded onto a small
edge-based device with a camera. Such a device would
then process its image feed in real-time, rapidly deter-
mining whether an individual is ‘ethnic’ or not.
Once determined, this compressed yet highly conse-
quential piece of information might be used in any num-
ber of ways. In border security, for instance, one could
imagine a green light turning red and a passenger se-
lected for additional screening. In a smart city scenario,
this data might be paired with a camera’s location and
uploaded to form an aggregated portrait of ethnic pop-
ulations over time. Such data is based on an individual
but rendered impersonal, providing insights for gover-
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nance while sidestepping the harder restrictions around
personal data. From a broader political perspective, the
scenario demonstrates how edge affordances might un-
derpin new forms of less governed control, establishing
a privacy condition that avoids directly confronting the
regulatory apparatus attached to privacy proper.
4. Questions for Privacy at the Edge
The edge complicates established privacy conditions,
reopening critical debates about the ways such infor-
mational architectures may impact the everyday lives
of individuals and amplify existing power asymmetries.
While the scenarios above raised some of these is-
sues indirectly, in the next sections they form three ex-
plicit questions.
4.1. What Data Will Be Collected at the Edge?
As millions of new devices are connected to networks
over the next few years, the possibilities of data cap-
ture will also proliferate. As discussed, these devices, lo-
cated in the home, on the wrist, or stationed around
the neighborhood, will be able to capture fine-grained,
highly personal data. While some network constraints
will certainly still persist, edge computing means that
data collection practices are no longer dictated so tightly
by transmission back to the cloud. Indeed, as mentioned
above, it is precisely these possibilities that have led to
the many articles on real-time monitoring, crowd mon-
itoring and ‘intelligent surveillance’ via edge comput-
ing (Ananthanarayanan et al., 2017; Bailas et al., 2018;
Dautov et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2018). This literature dis-
plays a general rush to embrace these possibilities, even
though these applications have clear implications for pri-
vacy intrusions and personal freedoms. What these en-
thusiastic responses demonstrate is that in many ways
it was technics, rather than ethics, which limited the ex-
tent of previous intrusions into personal data. Network
speeds, bandwidth capacities and physical distancewere
hard restrictions. To a significant degree, edge computing
lifts these constraints, providing more freedom to public
and private actors wishing to delve further into individu-
als and their lives.
These capabilitiesmean that the question of data col-
lection will hinge less on technical and economic con-
cerns (cost to transfer gigabytes back to the cloud) and
more on company culture, ethical values, and policy
stipulations—if these are even in place. With technical
constraints lifted, companies will be under increased
pressure to collect more, and more intrusive data, which
could provide key business insights. Yet individual com-
panies are not entirely free in navigating this ethical ter-
rain. Companies do not operate in isolation, but within
competitive industries, particularly the highly contested
technology field. Given these conditions, companies are
subject to the “coercion of competition” (Marx, 2004,
p. 675). If one company chooses not to push the ethi-
cal boundaries of data capture, others will (Kokalitcheva,
2019). At a time when comprehensive data has become
highly valuable, this decision grants one company strate-
gic advantage over their competitors.
4.2. How Will Data Be Processed at the Edge?
The edge introduces an additional layer of mediation be-
tween users and the cloud, forming a site for processing
data after it has been captured, but before it is stored and
centralized. As suggested by the scenarios above, this
interposition creates new possibilities for data process-
ing. Rich, highly detailed data can be captured by edge
devices and then processed by an edge hub in order to
extract nuggets of valuable information, which is then
passed back to a centralized cloud facility.
Abstraction becomes a key term within this process.
Howwill highly personal data be transformed into imper-
sonal, anonymized data? Here edge computing can draw
on a number of existing technologies, from k-anonymity
(Sweeney, 2002) to micro-aggregation (Domingo-Ferrer,
Sánchez, & Soria-Comas, 2016). These established tech-
niques, broadly applicable to any information set, in-
clude substitution, in which identifying values are ran-
domly replaced, shuffling, so that associations between
variables are lost, sampling, in which a partial set from
the whole is transmitted, and variance, in which numeri-
cal values are perturbed or altered (Curzon, Almehmadi,
& El-Khatib, 2019). Certainly, such technologies provide
established means of handling particular types of data
and aspects of applications. Yet they can also become a
way of black-boxing problems and arriving too quickly at
a ‘privacy solution.’
Instead, the task is to keep the question of data ex-
traction in the foreground: How is data mediated at the
edge and what is lost or gained in this intermediation?
Highly specific location data, for instance, might be cap-
tured at the edge, but then generalized into a district
or combined with other user locations. A gender field
might be used in an edge calculation, but then dropped,
something users may or may not want. An individual’s
race might be clumped into a parent category, impos-
ing a statistical system and erasing specific origins. In
every permutation, a slightly different data subject is
rendered (see Cheney-Lippold, 2018; Koopman, 2019).
These examples stress that the technical transformation
of information also has political and social implications.
Abstraction, then, should be seen less as a solution and
more as a set of design decisions around data. These de-
cisions come together to form a particular configuration
of practices and protocols, establishing a privacy condi-
tion that imposes itself on subjects in certain ways.
For those tasked with making these design deci-
sions, abstraction attempts to walk a tightrope, balanc-
ing the desire of states and corporations to “capture it
all” against the desire of individuals and their “right to
be let alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193). To claim
that nothing should ever be captured would be naïve, to
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claim that everything should would be unethical: “There
is a natural tension between the quality of data and
the techniques that provide anonymity protection,” ob-
serves Latanya Sweeney (2001, p. 33); given these ten-
sions, the goal is to design an optimal release so that “the
data remain practically useful yet rendered minimally in-
vasive to privacy.” For both public and private actors, cap-
turing valuable data while remaining sensitive to privacy
issues will take care and consideration.
4.3. How Is Data Completed in the Cloud?
If the edge is a site of intermediation, the cloud be-
comes the site of completion, where data is assembled
together, integrated into more formal structures, and
processed for additional insights. Completion stresses
the aim of both public governments and private corpo-
rations to exhaustively analyze data. If data is capital,
then in order to accrue more value, one must extract
more data from more subjects, accumulate it in increas-
ingly larger volumes, and mine it incessantly for insights
(Sadowski, 2019). Here the resource-constrained envi-
ronment of the edge leans heavily on the resource-rich
environment of the cloud. Indeed, new data center ar-
chitectures embrace this role as a site of intensive pro-
cessing, developing dedicated chips with liquid cooling
in order to support the heavy computation required by
machine learning applications (Sverdlik, 2018). If these
conditions are highly technical, the insights they derive
from high intensity processing shapes privacy conditions
in concrete ways.
Completion foregrounds the design of a data pipeline.
Decisions made about (1) what data to capture and
(2) how the edge processes that data must also take into
account (3) how the cloud processes that data to arrive at
productive insights. Here the cloud and the edge might
supplement each other with their respective strengths
and weaknesses. The edge is decentralized, with low la-
tency but low power, capable of capturing much but pro-
cessing, storing, and transmitting little. The cloud is cen-
tralized, ill-suited for capture with its high latency but ex-
cellent at processing and storage. Given these trade-offs,
the edge needs to deliver low volume but high potential
data that can be intensively processed by the cloud to
generate value.
As the two scenarios discussed above suggested, a
circuit for completing data and maximizing its value is al-
ready emerging. First, data is collected from devices dis-
tributed at the edge. This data is then distributed to the
closest edge node, processed in order to clean up or sam-
ple the data, and then passed onto a centralized cloud fa-
cility, where it is assembled into a training set of machine
learning. High intensity processing in the cloud is used to
train a model based on this dataset, gradually becoming
better over time. Once completed, the machine learning
model is then compressed into a light-weight version and
distributed back out to edge devices, where it can func-
tion autonomously.
Here we see a feedback loop, where captured infor-
mation becomes training data, which in turn contributes
to more comprehensive mechanisms of capture. Indeed,
whole companies have emerged based on riding this
loop of “embedding edge intelligence as close to the
source of streaming sensor data as possible” (Foghorn
Systems, 2019). If the realization of this approach is still
nascent, it is clear that developing such machinic intel-
ligence will follow the blueprint already laid down by
broader regimes of technical capture and data analysis.
The imperative is to more fully apprehend the individual
and her lifeworld, to more exhaustively grasp her proper-
ties, her practices, and her socioculturalmilieu (Harcourt,
2015; Pasquinelli, 2015; Steyerl, 2016). This circuit thus
strives to delve ever further into the subject and her ev-
eryday life, gradually apprehending her bodily character-
istics, daily behaviors, location over time, and social af-
filiations (Finn, Wright, & Friedewald, 2013), until no se-
crets remain.
While a company may complete its own data, com-
pletionmight also be undertaken in amore unauthorized
or unexpected way by others. Data collected at the edge
might well be anonymised in a robust way before trans-
mission to cloud storage facilities. However, as scholars
have shown, data can be de-anonymised by integrating
multiple datasets together and then cross-indexing val-
ues against each other (Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008;
Sweeney, 1997). Promises of unassailable privacy are of-
ten broken promises (Ohm, 2010). If the edge introduces
a new set of decisions about how data will be appro-
priately handled and transformed, these scenarios warn
companies and organizations that they must also take
into account the combinatorial possibilities of the cloud
as well.
5. End Run Around Privacy Protections
If edge computing holds out enticing promises, its abil-
ities may also impinge on the freedoms of individuals
and the rights of communities. In this sense, edge com-
puting forms the latest incarnation of what Shoshana
Zuboff (2019) has described as surveillance capitalism.
For Zuboff (2015, p. 83), surveillance capitalism accumu-
lates “not only surveillance assets and capital, but also
rights” through “processes that operate outside the aus-
pices of legitimate democratic mechanism.” Yet counter
to Zuboff, rather than acquiring rights, these technical
processes seek to never invoke rights. If big data accom-
plishes an “end run around procedural privacy protec-
tions” (Barocas & Nissenbaum, 2014, p. 31), then edge
computing also carries out an ‘end run’ of its own. The
goal is to extract data, value, and capital while never
venturing into the legal and ethical minefield of pri-
vacy proper.
One way of doing this is to respond to the indi-
vidual while filtering out, deleting, or abstracting away
data deemed to be personal. The small, hyperlocal de-
vices of the edge, situated in a smart home or a smart
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city, will be far more adept at latching onto the behav-
iors and bodies of individuals. The edge can respond
to these inputs in the moment, without storing the
names and identifiers typically associated with ‘personal
data.’ As a site of preprocessing, the edge is able to
draw upon single bodies and personal lives, yet imme-
diately abstract this data or aggregate it into a deper-
sonalized mass. In this sense, the edge resonates with
Antoinette Rouvroy’s observation that algorithmic gov-
ernance strives to never confront the person in her en-
tirety, to never directly call her up as a political subject.
‘The only subject’ such governmentality needs, Rouvroy
(2013, p. 154) stresses, is a “unique, supra-individual,
constantly reconfigurated ‘statistical body’ made of the
infra-individual digital traces of impersonal, disparate,
heterogeneous, dividualized facets of daily life and inter-
actions.” A subject is apprehended at an individual level,
but not necessarily identified.
Indeed, running through all these edge scenarios is
the sense that the former key question—whether or not
a user can be identified—may be subsumed by a far
more fundamental question: What forms of life are be-
ing extracted from the user even though they are not
identified? The de facto framing of privacy proper ush-
ered in by the GDPR has privileged personal data. Yet
this entire legal edifice of protections only applies once
this definition is reached. Perhaps data never needed to
be personal to be valuable. Perhaps control may be en-
acted and maintained without identifying a unique in-
dividual. Indeed, recent work on group privacy (Floridi,
2014; Mittelstadt, 2017; Taylor, Floridi, & Van der Sloot,
2016) responds precisely to this realization. Even with-
out explicit identification, the new spaces enabled by
edge computing present a verdant territory for extrac-
tive regimes (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2019), a rich zone
of markers and moments to capture and respond to.
While this extractivist logic deals with each person in
turn—capturing moods and faces, responding to bodies
and individual inputs, identifying movements and work
performances—its value is only obtained by aggregating
this data, by assembling and mining it en masse. This
is why Tiziana Terranova (2018, p. 1) stresses that the
“extractivism of data capital” siphons off the energetic
behaviors and activities of the broader social body. The
edge suggests a form of extraction that is individualized
but not personalized.
If the individual-but-impersonal is one way of carry-
ing out an end run around privacy, then another is avoid-
ing some of the sharper points of personal data laws.
While several existing laws regulate data that is ‘held’
(Mexican Congress, 2010) or ‘stored’ (U.S. Congress,
2018), the edge provides a new intermediary layer of in-
telligencewhere data can be captured, derived from, and
then discarded or fundamentally transformed before it is
stored. Through this affordance, the edge establishes a
new frontier site for processing, a grey zone that seems
sparsely covered by existing legislation, which has so far
focused heavily on a centralized cloud model. The tech-
nology industry is all-too-aware of this possibility, even
if it is framed as law abiding. “To avoid breaking the new
law and thus being fined, companies should keepmost of
the data collected out of the cloud and process it at the
edge” recommends one tech pundit (Valerio, 2018). Far
more effective than eroding privacy is never confronting
privacy proper to begin with.
Howmight we respond to the new privacy conditions
instantiated by edge architectures? Regulators and poli-
cymakers will need to develop a broader and more nu-
anced understanding of the cloud. If centralized, hyper-
scale data centers remain at the core of cloud computa-
tion, the edge connects a cascading set of devices from
regional hubs all the way down to local base stations and
wearable and personal devices. These devices, though
low-powered and often overlooked, form the new fron-
tier for data collection practices, passing information
streams up the chain, where it is aggregated together
before finally arriving at the traditional data center. Yet
if this ecosystem is vast, it is not monolithic. Devices
at each level have distinct capacities. For example, the
heavy encryption assumed in a full-scale data centermay
be impossible onmany low-end edge devices. Regulation
will thus need to be expansive but also articulated, devel-
oping codes and guidelines appropriate for each level of
this architecture.
Along with acknowledging the new constellation of
architectures that comprise the cloud, regulation also
needs to address the edge’s more situated, responsive
capabilities. As the scenarios above suggested, the con-
cept of storing an individual’s personal information in a
centralized database comes at the end of a long chain
of activities and possibilities—or never at all. While edge
devices certainly function as key points of capture, they
will also carry out important processing operations, espe-
cially as hardware and software within this nascent field
matures. Machine learning models, as discussed, are al-
ready being embedded in edge devices, meaning that
facial detection, video trimming, and other key opera-
tions can take place within the device itself in real-time.
Such datamay be retained, abstracted into less ‘personal’
forms and transmitted back to the cloud—or simply dis-
carded to make way for the next interaction. In doing
so, edge-based devices will allow individualized interac-
tions in the moment without having to fully confront the
person and her associated rights. These technical abili-
ties thus require a political and epistemological shift in
privacy safeguards. Rather than beginning from the au-
tonomous individual and her bundle of rights, rethink-
ing privacy conditions from an operational standpoint as
Cohen did might prove more suited for our era of rapid
technological change.
For their part, citizens, activists, and organizations
might productively question this model of personal pri-
vacy. Instead of this person-based approach, they might
move to more communal models, based on the group,
the neighborhood, the city, or the broader community.
Evgeny Morozov (2015, 2018a, 2018b) has been at the
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forefront of this questioning, long arguing that the cur-
rent model provides nominal protection for the individ-
ual, while continuing to funnel valuable data to tech
giants—Google, Amazon, Facebook, and others—who
monetize it for financial gain. Instead, he suggests a so-
cialized infrastructurewhere citizens could pool together
their data. This public data commons can be leveraged
by technologies for the public good, directing value back
into the hands of the data producers. This approach rec-
ognizes that individuals have little purchase on a po-
litical economy predicated on de-individualized, aggre-
gated data. Instead, thinkers like Morozov and other
data commons advocates (Jarman & Luna-Reyes, 2016;
Shkabatur, 2018; Simon, 2018) join group privacy theo-
rists (Mittelstadt, 2017; Taylor et al., 2016) in recogniz-
ing that privacy demands are both politically amplified
and technically clarified when coming from a commu-
nity. What would this community-based understanding
of privacy look like on an everyday operational level?
Due to the edge’s emergent nature,morework is needed
to bring together the technical, social, and legal and de-
velop a workable privacy model attentive to the novel
conditions that the edge introduces.
6. Conclusion
This article has explored how the shift to edge computing
introduces newprivacy challenges.Whilewidely covered
in engineering and computer science research, there
have been few, if any, studies on the cultural, social, and
political implications of edge computing. Given this gap,
this article hasmerely introduced some key concepts and
sketched out some initial possibilities. More research is
urgently needed to examine the tensions and decisions
ushered in by this paradigm,moving beyond technical ca-
pabilities to focus on social and ethical responsibilities.
After defining the edge and two framings of privacy, the
article posited two scenarios drawn from real-world engi-
neering articles: an ethnic facial detection model and an
automated license plate reader. While personal data se-
curity has been the traditional focus, these scenarios sug-
gested that the edge poses a more subtle and significant
set of questions. The technical affordances of the edge
allow data to be captured, processed, and completed in
new ways. Such decisions establish a significant privacy
condition, shaping the ways in which consumers are tar-
geted and the methods by which subjects are governed.
They suggest that asymmetric power relations might be
amplified while avoiding existing privacy regulation, slip-
ping through the definitions of personal data established
by current data safeguards. In this sense, novel network
architectures open up a legal and ethical loophole. If the
edge is seen as a technical solution, it also presents a po-
litical solution, facilitating a mode of power able to tar-
get the individual without crossing the threshold of pri-
vacy proper.
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